Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine under which a court gives issue-preclusive effect to findings of fact or law made in previous proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that under certain circumstances, the determinations of administrative adjudications have collateral estoppel effect in federal court. The Court, however, did not address under which circumstances the determinations of administrative adjudications should have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent administrative adjudications. There has been little clear and consistent reasoning in lower federal courts about when collateral estoppel should apply in administrative adjudications, and administrative agencies vary widely in their application of collateral estoppel when conducting adjudications.
INTRODUCTION
Mohammad Hassan Amrollah-Majdabadi ("Amrollah") was an Iranian pharmacist. 1 After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, he resented the repressiveness of the new regime. 2 In addition to participating in antigovernment protests, he began to provide medical supplies and money to an opposition group known as the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq 3 (MeK). The MeK had initially supported the Iranian Revolution of 1979, but had quickly turned against the new government. 4 The Iranian government repeatedly prosecuted Amrollah throughout the 1980s and 90s for his suspected support of the MeK. 5 In 1998, Amrollah received a subpoena to appear before the Iranian religious authorities. 6 Fearing for his life, he and his family fled Iran for the United States. 7 After illegally entering the United States, Amrollah applied for asylum. 8 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) immigration judge who heard Amrollah's application decided that, despite Amrollah's involvement with the MeK, his actions had not constituted terrorist activity, and he ruled that Amrollah and his family were eligible for asylum. 9 Amrollah changed his first name to Tom, and he and his family applied for permanent residency status in the United States. 10 After a long delay, his application for permanent residency was denied. 11 USCIS had reconsidered its earlier determination in the asylum proceeding and decided that Amrollah's involvement with the MeK did, in fact, constitute terrorist activity. 12 Amrollah appealed the agency's decision, and after losing in federal district court, he appealed again to the Fifth Circuit. 13 Amrollah argued that, because the issue of whether he had engaged in terrorism had been litigated and decided during his asylum hearing, USCIS was collaterally estopped from revisiting the issue in a subsequent adjudication. 14 The Fifth Circuit agreed, reversed the district court, and granted summary judgment for Amrollah. 15 The application was remanded 2. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Amrollah, 710 F.3d 568 (No. 12-50357). 3. Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 570. The MeK, or People's Mujahadeen of Iran, is a controversial Iranian opposition group with a Marxist-Islamist ideology. Jonathan Masters, Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 28, 2014), http://www. cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158 [https://perma.cc/W7L8-FJYB]. The MeK has been accused of violence against both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the previous Iranian regime under the Shah. Id back to USCIS, which had no choice but to grant Amrollah permanent resident status. 16 In holding that USCIS could not relitigate issues of fact or law already decided in a prior adjudication, the court relied on the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel (sometimes called "issue preclusion"). 17 The principle that the determinations of administrative adjudications, as well as court cases, can collaterally estop parties in subsequent proceedings has been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the last fifty years. 18 The Court's recent decision in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. 19 finally established a test for determining when an administrative determination will have collateral estoppel effect in federal court. 20 B & B Hardware, however, did not address the question that was raised in Amrollah v. Napolitano 21 : What is the collateral estoppel effect of an administrative adjudication on subsequent administrative adjudications? This Note explores the difficulties that agencies and federal courts have encountered when applying collateral estoppel from the findings of one administrative adjudication in another administrative adjudication. Part I summarizes the doctrine of collateral estoppel before describing the analytic framework the Supreme Court has constructed for determining whether agency determinations have collateral estoppel effect in federal court. Part II examines situations in which courts and agencies have had to determine the collateral estoppel effect of a prior agency decision on a subsequent adjudication by the same agency or another agency with overlapping jurisdiction. It examines a range of cases to show that courts have failed to provide clear guidance or resolve the tensions between collateral estoppel and administrative law. Part III discusses possible solutions, including whether the Court's current collateral estoppel framework can be expanded to encompass administrative adjudications and whether courts should adopt a set of per se rules governing when an agency's decision has collateral estoppel effect in subsequent adjudications. Finally, Part IV argues that, given the complexities of agency adjudications and the broad discretion federal agencies enjoy, agencies should be allowed to determine whether to rely on collateral estoppel on a case-by-case basis.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT In order to understand the problems that arise when applying collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications, it is first necessary to understand the four-factor analysis that federal courts use to decide whether collateral estoppel applies. Then, it is necessary to understand how this basic analysis 16 has been modified and applied by the Supreme Court when determining the collateral estoppel effect of agency determinations.
Part I.A describes the factors that courts normally consider when applying collateral estoppel, as well as the policy considerations that caused the courts gradually to expand the use of issue preclusion. Part I.B traces the evolution of the Court's reasoning on the collateral estoppel effect of administrative adjudications, starting with United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 22 through University of Tennessee v. Elliot 23 and Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 24 culminating with the Court's recent decision in B & B Hardware, in which the Court attempted to synthesize the reasoning from its earlier cases into a two-step analysis.
A. Collateral Estoppel Effect of Judicial Determinations in Federal Court
Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine under which a court gives preclusive effect to findings of fact or law made in previous proceedings. 25 In determining whether to apply collateral estoppel, courts generally rely on a four-factor test: First, is the issue identical to the issue in the previous proceeding? Second, was the issue necessary to the judgment in the previous proceeding? Third, was the issue fully and fairly litigated? And finally, did the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted have the opportunity to contest the issue? 26 Courts have broad discretion in deciding how much weight to give each factor in the administrative context. 27 Courts balance the interests of justice against the underlying 22. 384 U.S. 394 (1966) . 23. 478 U.S. 788 (1986) . 24. 501 U.S. 104 (1991 (1942) . Scott relies heavily on Cromwell, distinguishing collateral estoppel from the related doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 3-4. Res judicata precludes the relitigation of claims, whereas collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of the individual issues collateral to those claims. Id. 26. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 493 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the issue must be identical for collateral estoppel to apply); Montana, 440 U.S at 153 (holding that the issue must be identical and have been necessary to prior judgment, and the party against whom estoppel is asserted must have exercised some control over the litigation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."); see also Brian Levine, Note, policy goal of collateral estoppel, which is to provide finality between parties on the disputed issue. 28 Since the start of the twentieth century, courts have become increasingly willing to allow the use of collateral estoppel. 29 Initially, collateral estoppel only applied when both parties were identical or, at the very least, in privity with one another. 30 In addition to this "mutual" collateral estoppel, courts allowed "non-mutual" collateral estoppel, satisfied only where the party who is to be estopped was privy to the previous proceeding. 31 This liberalization also has extended collateral estoppel effect to "nontraditional" proceedings, such as arbitrations and administrative adjudications. 32
B. The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative Determinations in Federal Court
The expansion of the application of collateral estoppel gradually came to encompass administrative as well as judicial decisions. 33 28. See, e.g., Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54 ("To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions."); Scott, supra note 25, at 2. 29. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971) (noting "mutations in estoppel doctrine" including an "expansion" of the use of collateral estoppel that "enhanc[ed] the capabilities of the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but fairly" 
The Utah Construction Decision
The Court first suggested that administrative decisions could have collateral estoppel effect in federal court in Utah Construction. 35 The case was a dispute between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and a private contractor in which the contractor claimed breach of contract. 36 Under the contract, an administrative panel adjudicated disputes between the parties regarding how the contract would be performed. 37 When Utah Construction asked for additional time and money to complete the project due to changed conditions and incomplete government specifications, 38 the AEC's Advisory Board of Contract Appeals ("the Board") denied the company's claim after an administrative hearing. 39 The Board drew its authority from the Wunderlich Act, 40 which authorized the resolution of government contract disputes in administrative proceedings. 41 In denying Utah Construction's claims, the Board made the factual determination that changed conditions were not the cause of the delays and that, in any event, Utah Construction had not borne the cost of the delays. 42 Utah Construction responded by filing suit in the Court of Claims. 43 The Court of Claims determined that the Board had exceeded its authority under the contract, as it was authorized only to resolve minor disputes, not settle actions for breach of contract. 44 The Court of Claims granted trial de novo on Utah Construction's claims. 45 The Government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. 46 The Court reversed the grant of a trial de novo, holding that, while the Board could not settle a breach of contract claim, the Court of Claims had to respect the Board's factual findings. 47 Justice White, writing for the Court, said in dicta that, while the Court's decision was fully justified by the contractual terms as modified by the relevant statute, it was also "harmonious with [the] general principles of collateral estoppel." 48 Justice White noted that the Board was acting in its judicial capacity, the parties had had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and the determination of the issue had been necessary to the Board's 35 judgment. 49 Thus, the common law prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel were satisfied by the Board's decision. 50 Although the Utah Construction opinion indicated the Court's sympathy for the claim that administrative decisions could be given collateral estoppel effect, it stopped short of stating that collateral estoppel could have served as an independent basis for the Court's decision. 51 Many commentators, and some lower courts, concluded from Utah Construction that administrative adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in federal court. 52 The extent to which this applied, and exactly which agencies' rulings were entitled to collateral estoppel effect, remained uncertain. 53
Evolution of the Administrative Collateral Estoppel in Federal Courts
If the extent to which agency determinations had preclusive effect in federal courts was uncertain, the extent to which the administrative decisions of one agency bound another was even less certain. 54 Whereas applying collateral estoppel from agency decisions in federal court required the comparison of one agency's procedures and functions to those of the court, 55 this analysis was further complicated when it required that one agency be compared to another agency. For instance, if agencies had different mandates and areas of expertise, was collateral estoppel appropriate? 56 How should courts treat the myriad of procedurally diverse adjudications administrative agencies conduct? 57 The Court began to provide clarification in University of Tennessee v. Elliot state agency proceeding on issues in a federal discrimination suit. 58 The Court began its analysis by examining the provisions of Title VII 59 under which the federal claims had been brought. 60 Title VII required the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to give "substantial weight" 61 to state or local authorities' determinations. The Court concluded that, had the complaint been filed with the EEOC and not in federal court, the EEOC would have had to consider the state agency's position but not give it preclusive effect. 62 Holding that what did not bind a federal agency could not bind a federal court, the Court rejected the university's invocation of collateral estoppel based on the state agency adjudication. 63 Though the Court confirmed that agency determinations were entitled to collateral estoppel effect in federal court when the agency acted in a "judicial capacity," 64 the decision was, like Utah Construction, based on narrow statutory grounds that were not widely applicable in other contexts. 65 Furthermore, the involvement of federalism issues complicated the Court's analysis of collateral estoppel. 66 The Court returned to the issue of collateral estoppel in Astoria. Astoria involved an age discrimination complaint that originally had been filed with the EEOC, but was referred to a New York state agency under a work sharing agreement. 67 The state agency denied Angelo Solimino's claim, and he subsequently filed a complaint in federal court. 68 The federal district court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, citing the collateral estoppel effect of the state agency's determinations of fact and law. 69 The Second Circuit reversed the district court on the grounds that collateral estoppel was not appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 70 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal, holding that there was a presumption that administrative agencies' determinations were entitled to collateral estoppel effect when they acted in a "judicial capacity." 71 However, this was a "lenient presumption" 72 that could be overcome by an explicit or implied indication that Congress had not intended an agency's determinations to have collateral estoppel effect. 73 In Astoria, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 74 (ADEA), which was the basis of Solimino's claim, required the filing of a claim with the state agency before filing in federal court. 75 The Court reasoned that, if collateral estoppel were applied, it would effectively make it impossible to pursue ADEA claims in federal court. 76 As Congress had clearly contemplated the availability of federal remedies in the ADEA, the Court concluded that the state agency's decision could not have collateral estoppel effect. 77 Despite not granting collateral estoppel effect to the agency determination, Astoria's reasoning actually strengthened the case for the courts to find that administrative adjudications had collateral estoppel effect. 78 Before Astoria, courts could still plausibly claim that according an agency determination collateral estoppel effect was entirely within a court's discretion. 79 After Astoria, however, the lower courts had to recognize the presumption that agencies were authorized to make adjudicative determinations with collateral estoppel effect. 80 The reasoning of the case also differed from Utah Construction in that it did not rest its analysis on the equitable factors of common law that Justice White cited as making collateral estoppel appropriate in the administrative context, 81 but instead relied on legislative intent and statutory structure. 82 Petitioners could now argue that, not only could the courts give collateral estoppel effect to administrative determinations, but that they were required to by statute. 83 71. Id 86 The district court rejected the assertion of collateral estoppel, and the case was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. 87 Justice Alito, writing for the Court, applied a two-step process to determine whether collateral estoppel prevented Hargis from bringing the suit. 88 First, citing Astoria, Justice Alito determined that there was nothing in the statutory scheme that could overcome the presumption that the TTAB was acting in its judicial capacity and that its determinations were entitled to have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent proceedings. 89 Second, the Court applied the common law collateral estoppel factors, citing the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 90 The Court held that Hargis-the party against whom estoppel was asserted-had had a fair chance to litigate the issue before the TTAB, 91 the issue before the TTAB was essentially the same issue that arose in the subsequent suit, 92 and the issue was explicitly decided in the TTAB decision. 93 The Court, therefore, determined that the TTAB decision was entitled to collateral estoppel effect in the subsequent litigation. 94 The line of cases from Utah Construction through B & B Hardware created a template for deciding when an administrative adjudication should be accorded collateral estoppel effect in federal court. Utah Construction suggested that the common law collateral estoppel analysis could be applied to administrative decisions. 95 Elliot and Astoria established that, when Congress has authorized an agency to adjudicate, its determinations have a presumptively preclusive effect in federal court. 96 Hardware consolidated these principles into a two-step analysis: First, the agency must be acting in its "judicial capacity," 97 and there can be nothing in its statutory scheme that states or implies that Congress did not intend its determinations to have issue-preclusive effect. 98 Second, the application of collateral estoppel has to be equitable under a common law analysis. 99 Though certainly not immune from criticism, 100 this framework provides reasonably clear criteria under which courts can decide when to apply collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications in federal court.
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AMONG ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The architecture of the modern administrative state often requires agencies to conduct parallel, recurring, or overlapping adjudications, 101 meaning that the same party can be subject to proceedings concerning the same set of facts more than once. This raises the risk of inconsistent agency determinations, creates the possibility of repetitive or vexatious litigation, and promotes the general inefficiency of conducting multiple fact findings on the same issue. 102 These are the same basic concerns that have driven the adoption of collateral estoppel by the courts. 103 B & B Hardware creates a template for courts to apply collateral estoppel from an administrative adjudication to a federal court proceeding, but it does not address how to apply collateral estoppel from one agency decision to another. 104 Applying collateral estoppel across or within agencies increases the complexity of the common law collateral estoppel analysis and raises a host of concerns that are absent from the comparatively straightforward process of applying agency decisions in court. 105 
A. Application of Collateral Estoppel by the Courts
This section examines two questions that regularly arise when parties assert that administrative adjudications have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent administrative adjudications. First, what collateral estoppel effect should an agency give to its own prior adjudications on the same issue? Second, what collateral estoppel effect should an agency give the determinations of other agencies? Part II.A.1 examines the conflicting guidance courts have given when determining the collateral estoppel effect of an agency's own prior adjudications. Part II.A.2 discusses the lack of a clear standard for courts to use when applying collateral estoppel between different agencies' adjudications.
Concurrent and Recurring Adjudications by the Same Agency
The first situation that requires the courts to determine the degree to which an agency should or can recognize the collateral estoppel effects of its own decisions occurs when a single event triggers more than one adjudication by the same agency. 106 The adjudications can occur simultaneously or successively, either by chance or by design, as part of a multi-step process. 107 While this situation arises in a variety of administrative agencies, 108 it commonly occurs in the context of immigration status decisions made by USCIS (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)). 109 This is partly due to the sheer number of determinations that USCIS is asked to make 110 and partly due to the parallel and repetitive filings required by the regulatory scheme. 111 For instance, a prospective immigrant may have to apply for an entry visa, a work permit, and a green card. 112 The requests to obtain these documents can be filed simultaneously or successively, and the order in which determinations are made on each request depends largelyon processing times rather than any prerequisite that 106. See, e.g., Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 570-71 (2013) (noting that illegal entry into the United States required asylum hearings and permanent residency decisions for Amrollah, his wife, and his children).
107. See, e.g., id. at 571 (granting of asylum was a precondition for a hearing on permanent residency status); Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(a) (2015) (allowing adjustment of status to be filed before visa has been granted, so the two determinations may be made simultaneously or successively 111. In this Note, "regulatory scheme" refers to the decisional procedures and standards created by the agency. This is distinct from the "statutory scheme," which refers to the procedures required by Congress.
112. See generally Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § § 1101-1299 (2015).
one must be obtained before another. 113 Once obtained, these documents must regularly be renewed. 114 Many of these decisions require the consideration of the same facts and legal issues, leading parties to assert collateral estoppel. 115 The second situation in which agencies are asked to apply the collateral estoppel effect of an agency decision in that agency's subsequent adjudications is when a regulatory agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), revisits its decision concerning the permissibility of an activity. For instance, the SEC may reexamine the same type of financial transaction 116 or the EPA may regulate the same industrial activity repeatedly. 117 If, for whatever reason, the agency refuses to recognize collateral estoppel from the prior adjudication, the parties may ask that the agency's collateral estoppel decision be reviewed in federal court. 118 Some of the usual collateral estoppel considerations are moot in intra-agency collateral estoppel, so courts use a modified test. 119 In deciding whether to enforce collateral estoppel in intra-agency decisions, courts consider whether the issue was fully litigated, 120 whether the issue is identical in both 116. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463-64 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing the SEC to reexamine the legality of a type of transaction that it had previously allowed).
117. See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 185 (6th Cir. 1986) (allowing the EPA to impose higher emissions standards than it had previously required).
118. See supra note 13. Agency decisions are also reviewable on constitutional due process grounds. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
119. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining collateral estoppel factors). Agencies must state the reasons for their judgments and are in privity with themselves and other government agencies, so these two factors are not generally disputed. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2012) (requiring agencies subject to the APA to state the reasons for their conclusions); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940) (holding that government officers are in privity with one another for collateral estoppel purposes); United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding federal agencies are in privity with one another).
120. See Duvall v. Att'y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[Collateral estoppel] will not preclude relitigation of the issue when there is a substantial difference in the procedures employed by the prior and current tribunals."); City of Pompano Beach v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 774 F.2d 1529, 1538 n.10 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that the "agency proceeding . . . does not meet the test that the parties were afforded a full opportunity to litigate"); Mugomoke, 2014 WL 4472743, at *8-9 (holding that an asylum interview was not a proceeding that could form the basis of collateral estoppel). proceedings, 121 and whether a change of fact or law occurred between the proceedings that would justify a different outcome. 122 Courts have considered both the depth and purpose of proceedings in determining their collateral estoppel value. 123 For instance, a determination made in an initial asylum interview does not have preclusive effect on subsequent immigration proceedings seeking permanent residency. 124 Due to the vast variety of formal and informal agency adjudications, an emphasis on this factor may weigh against the application of collateral estoppel. 125 By contrast, when courts consider the collateral estoppel effect of an agency's own determination, they are likely to determine that the underlying issues are identical. 126 Agency adjudications, as creatures of statute, have limited subject matter jurisdictions, and the same legal or factual determination that is dispositive in one agency adjudication is often dispositive in subsequent adjudications. 127 If the issue is identical and was previously litigated, courts then consider whether a change of fact or law has occurred that is sufficient to defeat collateral estoppel. 128 Generally speaking, the courts give regulatory agencies deference in claiming a change in circumstance is sufficient to defeat collateral estoppel. 129 This is unremarkable, given that it is a wellestablished principle of administrative law that agencies may regulate and announce new regulations using any method at their disposal, including adjudications. 130 In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 131 the Court held that an administrative agency could craft a regulation through adjudication, even in the absence of a legislative change or formal rulemaking. 132 could approve of a certain practice in one adjudication and withdraw that approval in a subsequent adjudication. 133 Reconciling this agency discretion with the application of collateral estoppel has caused courts some trouble. For instance, compare Amrollah v. Napolitano with Michigan v. Thomas. 134 In Amrollah, a petitioner who had previously been granted asylum was denied permanent residency. 135 In granting the petitioner's request for asylum, USCIS determined that he had not supported terrorism. 136 Between his grant of asylum and his application for residency, however, the 9/11 attacks occurred, and USCIS expanded its definition of "supporting terrorism." This, along with the shift in public policy toward increased security, was the basis of the denial of Amrollah's permanent resident status. 137 The Fifth Circuit reversed USCIS, noting that the underlying facts were the same and the legal standard for "supporting terrorism" had not changed sufficiently to justify the reversal of the asylum decision. 138 In Thomas, the EPA refused to approve Michigan's proposed emissions rules, despite previously approving almost identical ones proposed by other states. 139 Like USCIS in Amrollah, on appeal to the circuit court, the EPA argued that a change in the scope of a definition justified its decision. 140 The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA was not collaterally estopped from holding Michigan to higher emissions standards. 141 Thus, in the absence of a Supreme Court determination, courts have been unable to provide clear guidance on when an agency is collaterally estopped by its previous decision. 142
Overlapping Jurisdiction Between Agencies
Courts also have confronted collateral estoppel issues when parties in an agency adjudication seek to enforce collateral estoppel based on the adjudication of another agency. 143 agencies have overlapping jurisdiction. 144 Interagency collateral estoppel is more complex, as it occurs across a wider variety of situations. 145 It also has the potential to present a problem if one or both adjudicating agencies claim their determination is entitled to Chevron deference. 146 Though the facts of the disputes about the application of interagency collateral estoppel vary much more widely, the legal arguments that the agencies present to courts tend to be recurring. As in intra-agency applications of collateral estoppel, courts consider the nature of the proceedings in which the issue was determined and whether the issue to be determined is the same in both adjudications. 147 Similarly, courts also consider whether changes in known facts or law are sufficient to defeat collateral estoppel. 148 However, when deciding to apply collateral estoppel across agencies, courts also are attentive to the differences in purpose and expertise of the agencies involved. 149 For instance, in Porter & Dietsch, Inc., v. FTC, 150 Porter & Dietsch argued that an adverse decision by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was estoppped by an earlier Postal Service decision that held the marketing for Porter & Dietsch's product did not contain fraudulent claims. 151 The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed. 152 The court noted numerous factors that militated against the application of collateral estoppel, finding that the FTC should not be prevented from using its increased subject matter expertise and that new information available to the FTC made the application of collateral estoppel inappropriate. 153 In prisoner parole. 155 Arnold Kramer was convicted of failing to file income tax returns and sentenced to four years in prison. 156 When he applied for parole, the Parole Commission relied on an IRS letter stating the amount of tax Kramer owed to determine that the seriousness of Kramer's crime required him to serve at least thirty-six months of his sentence. 157 Kramer appealed the decision, arguing that the Parole Commission had acted unconstitutionally by failing to give him an opportunity to challenge the IRS's determination of his liability. 158 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, disagreed. 159 He went further, stating that not only was the Parole Commission permitted to rely on the IRS's determination, but that it was probably required to defer to the IRS's expertise on the matter. 160 Though the court relied on the same consideration of agency expertise as in Porter & Dietsch, this time the circuit court seemed to arrive at the opposite conclusion by not only permitting the use of collateral estoppel, but also implying that its use might be mandatory. 161 These decisions could be reconciled on the theory that the courts in each case simply were deferring to the agency to decide what effect the agency must give the determinations of another agency. 162 Judge Easterbrook's dicta at the end of Kramer, however, appears to indicate that he believes that agencies may be required to apply collateral estoppel from other agency determinations. 163 Furthermore, in Kairys v. Immigration Naturalization Services, 164 the Seventh Circuit noted that agency discretion in deciding when to apply collateral estoppel was limited, but declined to define those limits. 165 Other courts also have struggled to produce a clear standard for applying collateral estoppel across agencies. In FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 166 the D.C. Circuit rejected Texaco's assertion of collateral estoppel based on a Federal Power Commission (FPC) decision. 167 courts deferring to the agency position on collateral estoppel, the panel's judges could not agree on why the FPC decision did not bind the FTC. 168 Arguably, the FPC had more subject matter expertise than the FTC, and in the opinion it is unclear whether the court relied more on procedural posture or substantive administrative law. 169 Additionally, even when an agency acts within its subject matter expertise, courts sometimes decline to show deference to the agency's position on collateral estoppel. In Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 170 the First Circuit required the Department of Labor (DOL) to give collateral estoppel effect to a state agency's workers' compensation determination. 171 Even though the court admitted federalism did not strictly require the application of collateral estoppel, as it might have in Elliot, 172 the court held that "a federal agency is normally bound to respect findings by another agency acting within its competence." 173 The court then conducted the common law multi-factor collateral estoppel analysis and concluded that the DOL had erred and that collateral estoppel did apply. 174 The court also rejected the idea that new information about the claimant's medical condition defeated collateral estoppel, noting that even a decision that was clearly wrong in light of new information could be protected by collateral estoppel. 175 Thus, an examination of multiple cases across the circuits presents no clear rule about when collateral estoppel applies across administrative proceedings. 176 Another aspect of the issue that courts have not addressed is what effect Chevron deference has on the application of collateral estoppel across agencies. 177 In arguing their interpretation deserves Chevron deference. 180 Collateral estoppel applies to matters of fact and law, 181 and agency adjudicative determinations may contain statutory interpretation. 182 This means that, if a court gives collateral estoppel effect to one agency's statutory interpretation, it could preclude another agency from interpreting the ambiguous statute with the deference that it would usually enjoy under Chevron. 183 The increasing number of agency adjudicative bodies and the proliferation of statutes, which are administered by multiple regulatory bodies with concurrent jurisdiction, 184 increase the chances that the application of collateral estoppel across different agencies will require courts to address agencies' conflicting statutory interpretations. 185
B. The Ways in Which Agencies Currently Apply Collateral Estoppel
The lack of consensus among the courts as to when collateral estoppel applies in administrative adjudications has not stopped agencies from developing their own methods of determining when collateral estoppel should apply. 186 There are three types of rules agencies employ. The first rule mirrors the common law collateral estoppel analysis and is generally applied by administrative law judges (ALJs) when considering the effect of prior adjudications by their own or another agency. 187 The second type of rule is one of interagency deference and is applied when agencies defer to the subject matter expertise of another agency that has previously adjudicated an issue. 188 The third type of rule is a rigid, per se rule used by an agency to determine what effect to give its own prior determinations. 189 Whichever rule they choose, however, agencies differ from courts by maintaining a much greater degree of discretion when deciding to allow or deny a previous administrative adjudication collateral estoppel effect. 190 The first way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications resembles the operations of the courts. Agencies that have ALJs or various levels of appellate review often employ the common law test to determine when to apply collateral estoppel from their own or another agency's prior adjudication. 191 reviews the decisions made by federal agencies to dismiss employees, regularly decides cases on the basis of collateral estoppel. 192 In doing so, it explicitly invokes the same four-factor test used by the federal courts. 193 It applies collateral estoppel both from its own decisions and the decisions of other federal agencies. 194 Other agencies, as varied as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, have found it appropriate to apply collateral estoppel on similar grounds. 195 The second way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications is less common and occurs when agencies defer to the expertise of another agency to decide a specific issue. 196 Agencies can choose to rely on the prior adjudications of other agencies when the subject matter presented is complex or outside their scope of expertise. 197 The actions of the Parole Commission in Kramer fit this model. 198 The last way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications is through per se rules governing which proceedings are entitled to collateral estoppel effect. 199 The SEC, for instance, considers that pleas in criminal cases have collateral estoppel effect. 200 193. See, e.g., Lee, 2014 WL 5326062 ("[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is appropriate when (1) an issue is identical to that involved in the prior action, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the determination on the issue in the prior action was necessary to the resulting judgment, and (4) the party precluded was fully represented in the prior action." (citation omitted)).
194. See id. (holding jurisdictional determination in previous appeal collaterally estopped appellant in subsequent appeal); Payer, 19 M.S.P.R. at 537 (applying collateral estoppel from a previous Department of the Army pay increase determination Whichever reasoning they use, agencies generally invoke collateral estoppel when they are faced with repeated proceedings against private parties and when relitigating the issue is unnecessary because a record on which the agency can make a decision has been developed in a prior adjudication. 202 This parallels the concerns of courts when they apply collateral estoppel to promote judicial economy and finality between parties. 203 Courts reserve broad discretion in deciding whether to apply collateral estoppel. 204 Agencies, however, claim the power to abrogate collateral estoppel altogether when it no longer serves the agencies' policy purposes. 205 Agencies are careful to maintain that collateral estoppel may not apply in their adjudications even if previous practice would indicate otherwise. 206 This reflects a principle of administrative law, which requires that an agency maintain flexibility in decision making. 207 The decisions of the courts in Porter & Dietsch, Thomas, and Duvall v. Attorney General 208 endorse this line of reasoning by relying on the agency's interest in improving its expertise, developing its regulations, and achieving Congress's policy goals. 209 In all of these cases, the common law analysis probably would have weighed in favor of applying collateral estoppel. 210 The courts reviewing the agency decisions in these cases recognized that considerations of administrative law required that agencies be given more leeway and not be so rigidly bound by past decisions. Hardware and discusses the applicability of this analysis in administrative adjudications. This view flows from the generally held assumption among commentators that whatever has the power to bind a federal court can bind a federal agency. 212 Therefore, any agency decision that would have collateral estoppel effect in federal court under the B & B Hardware analysis would also collaterally estop parties in subsequent administrative adjudications. 213 Part III.B considers a second approach, which rejects the case-by-case analysis in favor of per se rules. These rules would explicitly determine when an agency adjudication would have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent agency adjudications. 214 Commentators who are dissatisfied by the uncertainty in the application of collateral estoppel created by courts' reliance on multifactor tests often have advocated this view. 215 Part III.C discusses the third approach, which is to allow each agency to decide which adjudicative determinations it will recognize as giving rise to collateral estoppel. This approach relies on current administrative and regulatory mechanisms to ensure that agency decisions are fair. It also relies on interagency cooperation mechanisms to ensure that agency findings are consistent with one another, with courts intervening only as referees of last resort in case of an intractable disagreement between agencies. 216
A. The B & B Hardware Approach
This approach creates one standard for the application of collateral estoppel in federal proceedings. It applies the two-step B & B Hardware analysis to determine the collateral estoppel effect of administrative determinations in subsequent administrative adjudications. Part III.A.1 describes the framework, and Part III.A.2 discusses its benefits and drawbacks.
B & B Hardware Applied to Administrative Adjudications
After the Utah Construction Court suggested that administrative adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in court, courts and commentators assumed that this also meant that administrative adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in other administrative 212 
adjudications. 217 Administrative Collateral Estoppel: The Case of the Subpoenas was one of the early academic considerations of how courts
should apply collateral estoppel in the administrative context. 218 It examined the wide divergence of concurring and dissenting opinions expressed by the D.C. Circuit in Texaco and dealt with the issue of whether Utah Construction authorized the use of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications summarily, determining that it did by implication. 219 Subsequent academic works, including the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, also contained this assumption. 220 The Court endorsed this view indirectly in Astoria by holding that, when an administrative determination is not binding on a federal agency, it cannot be binding on a federal court. 221 This seemed to imply a congruity between an administrative agency's adjudicatory power to bind courts and its power to bind other agencies. 222 If this implied congruity is extended, B & B Hardware can be used to govern the use of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications. 223 Under B & B Hardware, courts and agencies would use a two-step analysis. They would first determine whether an agency's adjudicative determinations were entitled to collateral estoppel effect by examining the statutory scheme. 224 Then courts would determine if collateral estoppel was appropriate in the specific situation using a common law analysis. 225 The First Circuit's reasoning in Bath Iron Works neatly conforms to this template. 226 In that case, the court first examined the statutory scheme and discussed whether decisions made under the Longshoreman's Act had to be made de novo. 227 After the court determined that the Maine Workers' Compensation Commission had the power to make issue-preclusive determinations, it applied a common law collateral estoppel analysis. 228 217. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF After a brief discussion of the complexities involved in determining whether a state administrative agency decision could have collateral estoppel effect in a federal agency's adjudication, the court noted the appellee was seeking to "defend the result on narrower and more conventional grounds," that is, attempting to defeat collateral estoppel by Agency application of collateral estoppel is sometimes similar to the B & B Hardware two-step analysis. 229 Agencies often consider the statutory and regulatory scheme when deciding which adjudicative decisions give rise to collateral estoppel. 230 Agencies, and especially their administrative appeals boards, also regularly apply common law collateral estoppel factors. 231 Finally, application of the B & B Hardware analysis could help courts resolve interagency conflicts involving statutory interpretation under Chevron. The first step of the B & B Hardware analysis requires the court (or adjudicative body) to consider the statutory scheme. 232 When there is a Chevron conflict, courts similarly look to the statutory scheme to try to determine which agency deserves greater deference. 233 When an agency interprets a statute of general applicability, such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), courts do not grant Chevron deference. 234 Courts also deny agencies Chevron deference when they interpret statutes that are primarily the domain of another agency. 235 Applying these concepts to the B & B Hardware analysis, courts could decline to accord collateral estoppel to agency findings that rely on interpretations of general statutes, as such statutes fail to demonstrate congressional intent to invest the agency with the presumption of adjudicative authority. 236 Similarly, when both agencies are invested with adjudicative authority, the court could engage in an analysis to determine which agency is primarily responsible for conducting adjudications under the statute. 237 If neither of these analyses clearly favored one agency over the other, courts could continue with the common law portion of the B & B Hardware analysis. 238 If the agency decisions met the common law standard for the application of collateral estoppel, the court would settle the conflict in favor of the agency who adjudicated first. 239
Benefits and Drawbacks of the B & B Hardware Analysis
The B & B Hardware approach could increase the predictability with which collateral estoppel is applied while still allowing the courts the flexibility of an equitable balancing test. 240 Given the growth of the administrative state and proliferation of different types of administrative proceedings, a common complaint is that parties are often unsure how vigorously to contest adverse administrative determinations. 241 The consequences of the actual administrative decision may be minor but could have major legal consequences if given collateral estoppel effect. 242 The failure of courts to develop consistent lines of reasoning risks making the application of collateral estoppel appear arbitrary. 243 The application of the B & B Hardware rule, with its clear analytic steps, could go a long way to curing this defect. 244 There are two possible drawbacks to using B & B Hardware to make collateral estoppel determinations in administrative adjudications. The first is that, as a rule designed to be used in courts, it fails to take into account the variety of procedures in which agencies make their decisions. 245 Administrative determinations made in less formal proceedings that are not procedurally rigorous enough to be given collateral estoppel effect in federal court would also not be given collateral estoppel effect in other similarly informal adjudications. 246 245. See, e.g., Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1260 (noting that agencies have reclassified proceedings as being "adjudicative" or "nonadjudicative" in order to defeat the use of collateral estoppel).
246. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text (supporting the assumption of congruity between federal court and agency use of collateral estoppel).
247. See, e.g., Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting formal requirements on collateral estoppel where one agency relies on another's expertise).
248. That is, it could be used to deny collateral estoppel effect to determinations that policy considerations suggest should be given collateral estoppel effect. Courts sometimes use this analysis to examine procedural due process claims. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 448 (1989) (explaining the concepts of overinclusion and underinclusion and their common uses in legal reasoning). effect of prior procedurally sufficient adjudications, which would deprive agencies of the discretion to alter their positions and relitigate in the interests of public policy. 249 Another objection is that structure of the dispute in B & B Hardware is different from the structure of the disputes in other administrative collateral estoppel cases. 250 B & B Hardware is a case between two private parties, 251 as is Astoria. 252 Utah Construction and Elliot have governmental bodies as one of the parties, but in neither case are the governmental bodies the adjudicative agencies whose decisions are in question. 253 The Court's reasoning in B & B Hardware is focused on the rights and expectations of the private parties and their need for finality on issues. 254 However, in every case in which the courts are asked to compel or prevent an agency's application of collateral estoppel, the adjudicatory body is a party to the litigation. 255 Often times both parties are repeat players who are bound by statute or regulatory scheme to revisit the same issues periodically, whether or not collateral estoppel is applied. 256 commentators who have argued that the application of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications should be governed by per se rules. Part III.B.1 considers whether, in the administrative context, collateral estoppel's equitable balancing test should be replaced with a set of objective requirements designed to curb agency and judicial discretion and make the collateral estoppel effect of administrative adjudications more predictable. 258 Part III.B.2 considers potential benefits and limitations of this approach while examining a more flexible way to apply per se rules.
Adoption of Formal Per Se Rules for Collateral Estoppel
In a note entitled Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency Determinations: Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, David Brown argues that the increased application of collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications increases the risk of unfairness and inefficiency in subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings. 259 This risk primarily stems from the uncertainty surrounding the factors that courts consider when deciding to give an agency determination collateral estoppel effect. 260 Brown proposes to cure this defect by creating a formal checklist that an administrative adjudication must meet in order for its determinations to have collateral estoppel effect. 261 Brown first discusses the increased application of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications in the wake of Utah Construction and its progeny. 262 He then examines the factors that could make collateral estoppel appropriate as found by the Court in Utah Construction. 263 Brown argues that the requirements that the agency act in its judicial capacity and that adjudication give the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate have been subject to a wide range of interpretations. 264 Brown contends this uncertainty has two adverse effects. 265 First, it creates litigation inefficiencies in both administrative adjudications and federal courts. 266 Parties are unsure which administrative adjudications will have collateral estoppel effect and so have an incentive to litigate vigorously in otherwise low stakes administrative proceedings in order to protect themselves from an adverse decision that could be consequential in a future dispute. 267 Additionally, because parties cannot be certain whether an administrative adjudication will have collateral estoppel effect, the losing party has an incentive to try to relitigate the issue in court, if only to find out whether it is estopped from doing so. 268 The second concern Brown raises is unfairness. 269 He argues that the procedural variety of agency adjudicatory procedures, and the fact that regulatory agencies often act as parties rather than neutral arbitrators, 270 creates the risk that parties could be unfairly deprived of their chance to truly contest the issue. 271 Administrative adjudications have their own rules, which often limit the amount of evidence parties can present, the manner in which they can present it, and their ability to be represented by counsel. 272 Giving collateral estoppel effect to such a proceeding effectively would nullify the greater rights, protections, and opportunity to litigate that might be provided by a court or subsequent adjudicatory body. 273 Brown proposes to minimize these problems through a seven-point checklist that administrative adjudications would have to meet for their determinations to be entitled to collateral estoppel effect. 274 These include the right to counsel and to cross-examine witnesses. 275 Essentially, under Brown's proposal, only court-like proceedings would be accorded collateral estoppel effect. 276 This would ensure both uniformity and fairness across all administrative proceedings. 277
The Benefits and Limitations of Per Se Rules
Per se rules would ensure both uniformity and fairness across all administrative proceedings. 278 Litigants would know if any given adjudication has collateral estoppel effect and be able to adjust their behavior accordingly, eliminating the inefficiency of overlitigation and the unfairness of underlitigation. 279 However, Brown's specific proposals were designed with courts in mind, and only secondary consideration was given to collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications. 280 As with the B & B Hardware approach, Brown's proposals are not tailored to specific administrative adjudications and carry the risk of being underinclusive. 281 The procedural formality they require for a decision to have collateral estoppel effect would also be burdensome on agency decision making. 282 268. A more narrowly tailored version of the per se rules seeks to solve these problems. 283 In a note entitled Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, Brian Levine concurs with Brown about the cost of uncertainty inherent in the balancing test approach to collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications. 284 However, Levine dismisses the possibility of developing a single, comprehensive per se rule like the one proposed by Brown. 285 He believes that, given the variety on administrative and other proceedings, a comprehensive proposal for per se prohibitions is virtually impossible. 286 Levine instead argues that, in litigation where the benefits of predictability are high and the burden on courts of allowing relitigation of the issues is low, courts should develop per se rules limiting the collateral estoppel effect of previous administrative adjudications. 287 For instance, Levine argues in favor of a per se rule that administrative adjudications in unemployment claims do not give rise to collateral estoppel. 288 Levine's per se rules have the benefit of providing increased predictability while still allowing agencies some flexibility. 289 Some agencies already have per se rules similar to the type he proposes. 290 However, a potential drawback of these narrowly tailored prohibitions is the complexity of the system they would create. 291 Levine's approach also combines a balancing test with per se rules, and it is unclear whether this would really create more certainty. 292
C. Reasons for Giving Agencies the Discretion to Decide Which Administrative Adjudications Will Have Collateral Estoppel Effect
The application of collateral estoppel is usually classified as an area of procedural, rather than substantive, law. 293 Agencies have the discretion to choose which procedures they use, subject only to the requirements of the APA and their authorizing statute. 294 1992 ) (holding that "the main task of the reviewing court is to make sure that the tribunal actually exercised its discretion").
There are, however, two major issues raised by allowing agencies the discretion to decide if and when to apply collateral estoppel. The first is the concern that this will lead to uncertainty and unfairness among the parties that have to appear in administrative adjudications. 296 The second is that allowing agencies the discretion to decide the extent to which they will apply collateral estoppel will lead to unresolved conflicts between agencies. 297 Regarding the first concern, different agencies applying different rules, with the discretion to change those rules, will exacerbate the unpredictable nature of collateral estoppel. 298 However, agencies exercise their discretion to apply collateral estoppel most often by either applying the common law standard or formulating per se rules. 299 If the agency employs the common law balancing test, which is similar to the one used by courts, 300 the application of collateral estoppel is no more unpredictable than in court. 301 If they apply per se rules, 302 collateral estoppel is more predictable in the agency setting than in court. 303 Arguably, this makes collateral estoppel applied by agency discretion more predictable than that applied by courts. 304 When agencies do change the rules by which they apply collateral estoppel, they cannot act unconstrainedly. 305 At a minimum, federal agency actions are reviewable for violations of due process under the U.S. Constitution and to ensure they are not "arbitrary," "capricious," or otherwise irrational under the APA. 306 In Kramer, for instance, the court reviewed the Parole Commission's use of collateral estoppel to ensure it met due process requirements. 307 Agencies also are subject to other 296. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 848 (arguing, inter alia, that only agency decisions subject to judicial review should be given collateral estoppel effect 306. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) ("The reviewing court shall-(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.").
307. See Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1986).
requirements that limit their discretion to apply collateral estoppel. 308 The Sarbanes-Oxely Act, 309 for instance, requires that administrative decisions made pursuant to it be given collateral estoppel effect. 310 Similarly, certain Title VII 311 issues adjudicated by the EEOC are binding in other agencies' adjudications. 312 Agencies themselves also have an interest in acting in a rational and predictable manner. 313 Agencies are subject to political control and oversight. 314 An agency that acts in unpredictable ways or causes large amounts of uncertainty will draw criticism and find its actions curbed. 315 Even absent any other legal restraints, agencies tend to use their discretion to apply collateral estoppel in a predictable and equitable manner. 316 The other major concern is that agencies that share regulatory space will choose not to honor collateral estoppel from one another's adjudications and cause parties to be subject to conflicting and inconsistent rulings. 317 In practice, agencies have little incentive to, and rarely do, work directly against one another in this way. 318 When they do disagree, there are safeguards in place to resolve the disputes. 319 Executive agencies 320 operating in a shared regulatory space are subject to presidential control through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 321 (OIRA). They do not have the discretion to embark on diametrically opposed courses of action that could result in conflicting 308. See Kairys, 981 F.2d at 939-40 (holding that there are limits to agency discretion to apply collateral estoppel adjudicative decisions. 322 Independent agencies with concurrent jurisdictions often use interagency bodies to coordinate adjudicatory enforcement efforts. 323 All agencies are incentivized to cooperate and honor one another's adjudications, if only to increase the deference such proceedings are accorded by the courts. 324 Agencies with overlapping jurisdiction generally honor each other's adjudicative findings or arrange that only one agency conduct administrative adjudications, while the other, for instance, engages in formal rulemaking. 325 If all of these mechanisms fail, courts still can apply a primacy analysis to determine which agencies' decisions are entitled to collateral estoppel effect. 326 Therefore, granting agencies the discretion to decide when collateral estoppel applies in administrative adjudications is likely to produce decisions that are at least as consistent and predictable as those reached by the courts.
IV. CHOOSING A WAY TO APPLY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS The B & B
Hardware approach, the per se rules approach, and the agency discretion approach of applying collateral estoppel each bring their own set of problems and concerns. 327 Ultimately, however, this Note argues that courts should defer to agency discretion in applying collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications. Part IV.A discusses the difficulties of applying the B & B Hardware analysis, including underinclusiveness, overinclusiveness, and the incongruity of its underlying reasoning with the purposes and goals of administrative adjudications. Part IV.B demonstrates why neither broad nor narrow per se rules can create a workable system for applying collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications. Finally, Part IV.C argues that courts should defer to agencies when applying collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications.
A. Problems with the B & B Hardware Analysis
This section discusses why the problems that arise from using the B & B Hardware analysis in administrative adjudications make it an inappropriate standard for the application of collateral estoppel. Part IV. applying collateral estoppel so broadly that it could impede basic administrative and regulatory functions in agency adjudications. Part IV.A.2 examines the underlying problem, which is a tension between the policy reasons behind collateral estoppel and the structure of most regulatory schemes.
Underinclusiveness and Overinclusiveness
A serious problem with using the B & B Hardware analysis in the administrative context is that its first step makes it underinclusive. The requirement that the administrative body that made the initial determination be authorized by statute to make binding adjudications is justified when applying collateral estoppel in a judicial proceeding. 328 However, it risks becoming needlessly burdensome in less formal administrative proceedings. 329 This issue is probably best illustrated in Kramer. The Seventh Circuit allowed the Parole Commission to base its findings on the amount Kramer owed the government, contained in a letter from the IRS estimating his tax deficiency. 330 This letter almost certainly would have failed to be accorded collateral estoppel effect under B & B Hardware, because the statutory scheme requires that the IRS finding be subject to collateral and direct attack in federal tax court. 331 B & B Hardware, if applied to this case, would have required the Parole Commission to allow Kramer to relitigate his tax debt before the board and the board to render its own decision. 332 Results like this are inefficient not only because they require a duplication of effort but also because they prevent agencies from relying on the specialized knowledge and expertise of other agencies. 333 In order to avoid this problem when applying collateral estoppel, most agencies (and some courts) do not consider the absolute authority invested in the body that made the initial determination. 334 Instead, they consider the relative similarity between the first proceeding and the subsequent proceeding in which collateral estoppel is asserted. 335 should not be necessary for an administrative adjudication to be able to bind a court for it to bind another administrative adjudication. It should be enough to determine that the two proceedings have a similar level of procedural formality and authority. 336 The B & B Hardware analysis is also overinclusive, as applied to agencies' own past decisions. The common law analysis, which is the second step of the B & B Hardware approach, could effectively prevent agencies from promulgating rules through adjudication. 337 As the Court recognized in B & B Hardware, the application of collateral estoppel does not require that the issues presented be formally identical, but rather substantially similar, especially when the parties themselves are identical. 338 Furthermore, even clear legal and factual errors, if not appealed, usually are not subject to collateral attack. 339 The common law version of collateral estoppel in B & B Hardware endorses the outcome of Amrollah rather than Duvall or Thomas. 340 This outcome creates a conflict with the broader principle of administrative law enunciated in Chenery, 341 as it would enable a party to prevent an agency from modifying a previously enunciated rule by invoking collateral estoppel. 342 By effectively limiting the ways in which agencies can regulate, the robust collateral estoppel doctrine espoused in B & B Hardware not only would conflict with nearly seventy years of precedent, but also could significantly raise the cost and difficulty of regulating for administrative agencies, such as the SEC and the National Labor Relations Board, which use adjudicatory regulation to supplement their rulemaking. 343 
The Incompatible Policy Goals of Collateral Estoppel and Administrative Law
The problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness inherent in the B & B Hardware analysis reflect a deeper tension between the policy concerns that have led courts to favor collateral estoppel and those that underpin much of administrative law. 344 The difference in the structure of the disputes highlights the difference in policy considerations when applying collateral estoppel in court as opposed to an administrative adjudication. 345 In disputes between private parties, such as B & B Hardware and the line of cases that preceded it, a limited number of issues are implicated, and those same issues are unlikely to recur between the parties once settled. 346 Judicial economy and basic fairness are best served by ensuring that, once the parties have contested an issue in an appropriate forum, regardless of the exact nature of that forum, the losing party cannot waste time and money relitigating the issue. 347 This need for finality is the underlying policy consideration that justifies all applications of collateral estoppel, including the use of collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications in federal court. 348 This underlying logic is not applicable when attempting to justify the application of collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications. The adjudicatory body, as a party to the litigation, 349 is interested not just in "winning" or achieving "repose," but also in constructing a workable regulatory scheme in accordance with legislative intent. 350 In many cases, this end is best served by preventing finality and allowing the relitigation of issues. 351 Cases in which the collateral estoppel from an administrative adjudication is applied in court are structurally different from cases in which collateral estoppel is applied between administrative adjudications. 352 As a result, the fundamental policy considerations involved are different. The B & B Hardware analysis, with its robust common law version of collateral estoppel, 353 simply is not appropriate in an administrative context.
B. Problems with Per Se Rules for Administrative Collateral Estoppel
This section discusses how per se rules for collateral estoppel often can complicate, rather than simplify, the problems inherent in the balancing tests. Part IV.B.1 argues that broad, formalistic rules, such as those proposed by Brown, would limit agency discretion in ways that are inconsistent with the current legal landscape and frustrate the purposes of administrative law. Part IV.B.2 points out that narrow, ad hoc rules, such as those proposed by Levine, are in many ways worse and would actually increase uncertainty in administrative adjudications.
Problems with Broad Per Se Rules
Broad, generally applicable prohibitions that rely on a formal set of rules, such as the ones proposed by Brown, are not appropriate when applying collateral estoppel across agencies. Any set of formalistic determinations would also be both overinclusive and underinclusive 354 : the sheer variety of agency proceedings defies the imposition of any objective standard, and any comparison of two administrative adjudications would involve a balancing test rather than a formal checklist. 355 Furthermore, the judicial imposition of a generally applicable formal rule would be an anomaly in administrative law because, within their statutory frameworks, agencies are given the discretion to determine their own decision-making procedures. 356 The Supreme Court has consistently pushed back against lower courts that have attempted to impose formal requirements on agency procedures. 357 A judicially created formal requirement that dictated the extent to which agencies could rely on prior administrative adjudications would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Court's jurisprudence. 358
Problems with Narrow Per Se Rules
Narrowly tailored per se prohibitions, such as those proposed by Levine, 359 are even more problematic. They would serve to complicate, rather than clarify, the application of collateral estoppel among agencies and only address when collateral estoppel would be prohibited rather than providing guidance as to when it would be allowed. Levine himself acknowledges that his proposed analysis to determine when per se prohibitions on collateral estoppel are appropriate adds another balancing test to the ones courts already must consider when applying collateral estoppel. 360 Furthermore, a per se prohibition would have to address to which types of administrative adjudications it applied, or it would risk being underinclusive. 361 Given the sheer variety of administrative adjudications in which collateral estoppel can be invoked, even a single per se rule would be complex. 362 This, combined with the fact that courts and agencies would certainly disagree about which per se prohibitions applied to which adjudications, would create a complex and unworkable system. 363 Finally, even after the adoption of per se prohibitions, there still would be administrative adjudications where the application of per se prohibitions would not be appropriate. 364 In these cases, courts and agencies still would have defaulted to the common law balancing test to apply collateral estoppel. 365 Thus, per se prohibitions would add layers of complexity and uncertainty to administrative collateral estoppel determinations by adding a new balancing test without actually replacing the current collateral estoppel balancing tests.
C. Courts Should Defer to Agencies When Reviewing the Application of Collateral Estoppel
Courts already defer to agencies when they interpret statutes and engage in rulemaking. 366 As long as they act within the boundaries and for the purposes established by the legislature, agencies have wide discretion. 367 This section argues that judicial constraints on agencies applying collateral estoppel are unnecessary and inconsistent with the larger body of administrative law. It concludes that courts should defer to agency decisions when deciding whether a prior administrative adjudication has collateral estoppel effect on a present one.
Agencies are already subject to a number of constraints, both legal and political. 368 These prevent agencies from acting in ways that are arbitrary or grossly inconsistent. 369 An agency decision to apply collateral estoppel from one adjudication to another adjudication is already bound by these 360. Levine, supra note 26, at 453. 361. See supra Part IV.A.1. A per se rule would have to say something like "adjudication A has collateral estoppel effect on Adjudication B, but not on Adjudication C" in order to avoid the underinclusiveness problem.
362. See Levine, supra note 26, at 449; Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1259-61. 363. Levine himself acknowledges that his system would increase the frequency of inconsistent judgments. constraints. 370 Additional constraints, such as the equitable balancing test contained in B & B Hardware or the judicially imposed per se rules advocated by some commentators, are largely unnecessary. 371 They add additional layers of analysis that complicate an already complex area of the law, creating rather than solving anomalies and uncertainties. 372 Furthermore, agencies are created by the legislature, as are the limits of their discretion. 373 Agencies' power to make decisions that have collateral estoppel effect flows from the discretion granted to them by Congress. 374 The Supreme Court has consistently pushed back on courts' attempts to limit agency discretion with judicially created or enforced limitations. 375 Where an agency has the power to adjudicate, therefore, it should have the discretion to apply collateral estoppel as it sees fit, subject only to legislative constraints. 376 Attempts to limit this discretion are inconsistent with other doctrines and policies of administrative law. 377 For instance, requiring agencies to recognize the collateral estoppel effect of their own prior adjudications is inconsistent with agencies' ability to interpret statutes and make rules through administrative adjudications. 378 Constraining an agency to abide by the past determinations of it or another agency is against the policy of allowing agencies to have evolving standards that reflect growing expertise and changing conditions. 379 On the other hand, preventing agencies from relying on the findings of prior adjudications could lead to unnecessary and wasteful litigation. 380 Courts should therefore defer to agencies when reviewing their use of collateral estoppel. This approach lacks the doctrinal neatness of per se rules and the intuitive appeal of the extension of the B & B Hardware analysis. 381 It is, however, the best way to ensure a flexible and equitable application of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications and the only approach that is consistent with the broader principles of administrative law.
CONCLUSION
Collateral estoppel is an equitable common law doctrine that courts use to enforce repose between private parties once an issue has been litigated. The Supreme Court has expanded its use in federal court, granting collateral estoppel effect to determinations of fact and law made in administrative
